General Emilio Aguinaldo was confronted on May 7, 1897 with an incontrovertible fact : The “Consejo de Guerra” (or Council of War) that he had assembled to try and pass judgement on Andres and Procopio Bonifacio had returned a guilty verdict. It ordered that the two brothers should be shot to death. In his handwritten statement dated 22 March 1948, Aguinaldo admits that he has been hounded by speculations surrounding the death of the founder of the Katipunan, the beloved hero of the Philippine Revolution, Andres Bonifacio. He writes this account, presumably for the benefit of Jose P. Santos, who has published a series of accusatory tracts against him, including the best-selling biography of Bonifacio’s widow, Gregoria de Jesus. He then states that he had initially commuted the brothers’ death sentence to exile. Under pressure from two members of that Council of War that had found them guilty — to wit, General Mariano Noriel and General Pio del Pilar — he had decided to go forward with the tragic order. This he did for the sake of all their lives and for the good of the Republic. “Ito ang matanto nina Heneral Mariano Noriel, General Pio del Pilar, na mga kagawad ng Consejo de Guerra ay dalidaling tinawagan ang aking pansing at sinabing “Kung ibig po ninyon mag patuloy ang kapantagan ng ating Pamahalaan sa Paghihimagsik, at kung ibig po ninyong mabuhay pa tayo, ang inyong bawiin ang iginawa na indutlo sa kapatid na iyan. “Dahil ditoy aking binawi at iniatas ko kay General Noriel na pi atupad ang kahatulan ng Consejo de Guerra, na barilin ang mga kapatid, alang-alang sa kapakanan ng Bayan,” wrote Aguinaldo. In the second account’s typewritten portions, Aguinaldo maintains that he had reduced the death sentence to exile but that his orders had not reached his officers in time because of the fog of war. These lines are crossed out, however, and are amended with the same words as in the handwritten statement. Nick Joaquin, writing in 1975 in Archipelago Magazine, described Bonifacio and his revolution as the short-lived triumph of the working class, the laborers and urban poor of Manila. When Bonifacio crossed into Cavite — although he was thoroughly unaware of it, believing in the universality of the Katipunan’s struggle — he was destined to come into conflict with the bourgeoisie of that province. These were the government officials, teachers, lawyers, engineers, who would inevitably sneer at the self-educated but no less capable Bonfiacio. It was also, alas, the age-old resentment of the Manileño by those that lived outside its imperial borders. For Nick Joaquin, Aguinaldo represented the successes of the Caviteño generals — versus the failures in battle of Bonifacio and his men. (Some say that Cavite, being a peninsula, was far easier to defend.) Aguinaldo had on his side, the trench-warfare expert Edilberto Evangelista. Bonifacio had Emilio Jacinto, an intellectual and poet. Time after time, Andres Bonifacio would take for granted his position as the founder of the Katipunan. He would do it at the Tejeros Convention, when he was badly outmaneuvered. He would continue to be outflanked at every turn afterwards. On the other hand, Aguinaldo would never be entirely secure about his own position as President of the revolutionary government. Time after time, he would act ruthlessly to safeguard it. It was also true that despite Bonifacio’s defeat at Tejeros — and the closing of ranks of the Caviteño elite against him — the common folk in both the Magdalo and Magdiwang territories were still enamored of Bonifacio. There was much ill feeling that Bonifacio had been badly treated and rumors were flying thick and fast about a backlash against Aguinaldo. In fact, Bonifacio had begun to put together his own coup d’etat. General Mariano Noriel, the Magdalo chief of staff, probably stung by Aguinaldo’s appointment of the rival Artemio Ricarte as the captain-general of the new revolutionary government, was easy enough to turn; as was General Pio del Pilar. Noriel and del Pilar, said Aguinaldo in both his accounts, were instrumental in convincing him to stay the course and pushing forward with the death sentence of the two Bonifacio brothers. Could this have been true? Both Noriel and del Pilar had been guilty of a momentary lapse in their loyalty to the new President. Were they eager to now prove their allegiance to the new strongman? Or was this Aguinaldo’s way of slyly ensuring that they would never again be accepted in the forces of Bonifacio’s remaining loyalists? The narrations pose another interesting question : What would have happened if indeed Bonifacio had been allowed to live? Would have civil war erupted? Or would have Bonifacio been allowed a role in the new regime — and then perhaps a government balanced by more idealistic men would have been given the chance to take root and prosper. Bonifacio would not brook the pillaging of Filipino towns and would routinely order men to be shot if found guilty of looting; Aguinaldo was practical-minded and would use the spoils of war as incentives to his men. José Rizal — in that now-distant time in Dapitan — had advised Bonifacio to recruit Antonio Luna to the Katipunan and to have him direct the war against the Spanish. Alas, Luna had rebuffed Bonifacio’s invitation, saying that even Napoleon needed money for arms.When the Philippine Revolution exploded, Luna had then been imprisoned, tortured, and only released in the care of his influential brother Juan Luna. By then, Antonio’s mind had been made up to fight for liberty but it was far too late for Bonifacio. But just think, what If these two formidable men had been allowed to find their way to each other, who knows what kind of Philippines we would have today. Emilio Aguinaldo makes it clear, says scholar Jim Richardson, that the final decision to execute Andres and Procopio Bonifacio was his. By giving the order for execution, Aguinaldo single handedly changed the course of the Revolution and our nation’s future. — Lisa Guerrero Nakpil